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ABSTRACT
Hermeneutical aspect of reference embraces a relation to reality in its 
broadest sense. This aspect of reference explains how some concepts 
employed in scientific theories and historical and fictional text, which are 
considered as “non-existant”, transform our experience of reality. Episte-
mological aspect of reference should not be separated from ontological and 
hermeneutical aspects.
Key words: reference, narrative, scientific realism, history, fiction, meta-
phore.
RESUMEN
Los aspectos hermenéuticos de la referencia contienen una relación con la 
realidad en su más amplio sentido. Estos aspectos de la referencia explican 
cómo algunos conceptos empleados en las teorías científicas, la historia y los 
textos de ficción, los cuales se consideran como “no existentes”, transforman 
nuestra experiencia de la realidad. Los aspectos epistemológicos de la refe-
rencia no deberían separarse de los aspectos ontológicos y hermenéuticos.
Palabras clave: referencia, narrativa, realismo científico, historia, ficción, 
metáfora.
1. Introduction
the significance of ricoeur’s Time and Narrative Vol. 1, 2 and 3 lies 
in Ricoeur’s extension of the meaning of the terms: “reference”, ”reality”, 
“plot”, “mimesis” and “narrative paradigm”. By broadening the meaning of 
these terms, Ricoeur includes yet another perspective from which historical 
and fictional narratives ( as well as scientific theories ) and their concepts 
can be understood. He points to hermeneutical aspect of reference, which 
* Recibido Agosto de 2009; aprobado Noviembre de 2009.
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was often neglected in favor of the epistemological aspect of reference, in 
the history of philosophy. 
2. Ricoeur’s Conception of Reference
the conception of reference as refiguration is the main idea presented in 
Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, vol. 3 (1988). Ricoeur argues that reference 
is not synonymous with denotation. Ricoeur’s conception of reference can 
be employed, not only to explain the refigurative character of non-referential 
concepts in historical and fictional texts, but in scientific texts as well. 
When Ricoeur uses Aristotle’s term mythos, he, instead of the pronoun 
intrigue (plot), uses the expression la mise en intrigue (emplotment, building 
of the plot), because he emphasizes that the process of the genesis of the 
narrative is a dynamic process. Ricoeur argues that mythos and mimesis are 
dynamic categories, that they are operations, not structures. For Ricoeur, 
mimesis should be perceived as a mimetic activity. It is a threefold process 
made of mimesis 1 - prefiguration (i.e. preliminary understanding of the world 
of praxis), mimesis 2 - configuration (imitation, representing the action by 
the formation of the text), and mimesis 3 - refiguration (which represents 
the sphere of the reception of the text).
Ricoeur argues that the terms mythos and mimesis are closely connected. 
Ricoeur’s concept of mimesis does not mean pure copy.  It represents  a 
creative imitation. Ricoeur equates mimesis with mythos.1 
 According to Ricoeur in mimesis 1, “to imitate or represent an action is 
first to understand what human action is in its semantics, symbolic system, 
and its temporality.” ( Ricoeur, 1984, p. 64 ) Thus, mimesis 1 designates 
a preliminary understanding of the human praxis, which precedes textual 
configuration. this, according to ricoeur, means that narrative texts would 
1 Ricoeur argues that mythos can be equated with mimesis in his books and articles ( Rule 
of Metaphor, “Metaphor as Representation”, “What is Text”), which he wrote prior to Time 
and Narrative, where he entirely derives his conception of mythos and mimesis. This means 
that Ricoeur does not equate mythos (which he in Time and Narrative vol.1 defines as 
configuration – mimesis 2) , with mimesis (which, as he shows in Time and Narrative vol. 
1, includes mimesis 1 (prefiguration), mimesis 2 (configuration), and mimesis 3 (refigura-
tion) ). What he has in mind when he equates mythos with mimesis in  Rule of Metaphor 
is that “mythos is in service of mimesis” : “And ought we not to add that this lyric mythos 
is joined by a lyric mimesis, in the sense that the mood created in this fashion is a sort of 
model for “seeing as” and “feeling as”? (Ricoeur, 1975,  p. 245) “But lyric mimesis, which 
can be taken if desired as an “outward” movement, is the very work of the lyric mythos; it 
is the consequence of the fact that the mood is no less heuristic than fiction in the form of 
the story. The paradox of the poetic can be summed up entirely in this, that the elevation of 
feeling to fiction is the condition of its mimetic use. Only a feeling transformed into myth 
can open and discover the world” (Ricoeur, 1975,  p. 245).
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not be comprehensible if they didn’t attempt to shape experience, which 
already has its form in the sphere of human praxis.
Mimesis 2 represents the “kingdom of as if “. ( Ricoeur, 1984, p. 65 )  It 
is connected to mimesis 3 by act reading or watching. Ricoeur explains that 
mimesis 3 represents the intersection of the world of the reader and the world 
of the text, “therefore, it is the intersection of the world unfolded by fiction 
and the world wherein actual action unfolds.” ( Ricoeur, 1991, p. 148 )  
 According to Ricoeur, “The sense is what the proposition states, the 
reference, or denotation, is that from which the sense is started” ( Ricoeur, 
1975, p. 217 ). He mentions Frege’s example of Venus which was referred 
to as both “morning star” and “evening star”. Ricoeur maintains: “This lack 
of one-to-one relationships between sense and reference is characteristic of 
common languages, and distinguishes them from a system of perfect signs. 
The possibility that no reference corresponds to the sense of a grammatica-
lly well-formed expression, does not weaken the distinction; rather, not to 
have reference is another trait of reference that confirms that the question of 
reference is always opened by that of sense” ( Ricoeur, 1975, p. 217 ).
Ricoeur introduces the concept of null-reference. He argues that even 
non-referring concepts are a part of our experience and reality. The concept 
of null-reference (or non-reference) cannot be referential in the theories 
which equate reference with denotation. That is why there is no room for 
this concept in the realist and antirealist conceptions of reference.
Ricoeur maintains that “as long as we identify reference and denota-
tion, we take account only of the first direction, which consists of applying 
“labels” to “events”. ( Ricoeur, 1975, p. 21) Ricoeur points to “the second 
direction in which reference operates (...). It consists of exemplifying, that 
is, of pointing out a meaning or property that something possesses” (Ricoeur, 
1975, p. 233). 
According to Frege, striving for the truth moves us from sense to refe-
rence. but the desire for truth is often ascribed only to scientific statements, 
while it is denied to poetic and literary statements. For example, literary 
statements in which the proper name “Ulysses” is employed have no refe-
rence. Thus, the whole literary work that contains such statements has no 
reference, only sense.
In the article “What is Text?”, Ricoeur argues that the nature of reference 
in literary texts brings a different approach to the concept of interpretation. 
“It implies that the meaning of a text lies not behind the text, but in front 
of it. The meaning is not something hidden, but something disclosed. What 
gives rise to understanding is that which points towards a possible world 
by means of the non-ostensive references of the text. (…) Disclosure plays 
the equivalent role in written texts as ostensive references play in spoken 
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language. Interpretation thus becomes the apprehension of the proposed 
worlds that are opened up by the non-ostensive references of the text” 
(Ricoeur, 1991, p. 177). 
according to a scientific approach to truth and reality, there is no truth 
beyond possible verification and all verification is linked to the domain of 
facts. according to a scientific approach, because literary fictional texts are 
descriptive (they don’t give information about facts) and thus emotional, 
they do not designate (refer). What ricoeur argues is that in literary fictional 
discourse there is a suspension of reference. That suspension represents the 
appearance of a broader conception of reference as well as reality. Ricoeur 
argues that  explication of this mode of reference is the task of hermeneu-
tics. 
In Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur argues that his aim is “to do away with 
this restriction of reference to scientific statements” (ricoeur, 1975, p. 68). 
He argues that what a reader receives is not just a sense of the literary text, 
but through this sense – a reference. In the same manner, it can be reasoned 
that scientific terms that are considered non-referential, do refer, since they 
are a part of our world and reality. It is through a sense of these terms that 
we receive their reference.
The question is, if those terms are referential, what do they refer to? The 
answer can be found in Ricoeur’s analysis of reference of literary texts.
Ricoeur states that in spoken language reference is ostensive, while in 
written language it is not. Ricoeur argues that literary texts speak about 
the world, but not in a descriptive way. He explains that non-ostensive 
references point to possible worlds: “Texts speak of possible worlds and of 
possible ways of orienting oneself with those worlds. In that way, disclosure 
becomes the equivalent for written texts of ostensive references for spoken 
language. And interpretation becomes the grasping of world-propositions, 
opened up by the non-ostensive references of the texts” (Ricoeur, 1991, 
p. 314). Ricoeur argues that the concept of the world must be extended in 
order to embrace non-ostensive and descriptive references, as well as non-
ostensive and non-descriptive references. “For me, the world is an ensemble 
of references opened up by every kind of text, descriptive or poetic, that we 
have read, understood, and loved. And to understand a text is to interpolate 
in the predicates of our situation all the indications that make a Welt out of 
an Unwelt. It is this enlarging of our horizon of existence, which permits us 
to speak of the reference opened up by the text or of the world opened by 
the referential claims of most texts” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 331).
In order to explain how the reference is “opened up” by the text, some key 
points of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics will be presented in the following lines.
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Ricoeur’s theory of text is an attempt to overcome “romantic herme-
neutics”, which dominated since Schleiermacher and Dilthey. It equated 
the understanding of the text with the understanding of author’s intention. 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is an attempt to overcome romantic hermeneutics. 
He disagrees with its proponents who favour understanding to explanation, 
and view them as two different methods. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is also an 
attempt to overcome the positivist approach, whose advocates promote the 
universality of scientific explanation. ricoeur emphasizes that he cannot 
accept the irrationalism of immediate understanding based on empathy 
( Ricoeur, 1991 ), by which a subject puts himself in the place of a foreign 
consciousness.2 
However, he also cannot except “a rationalistic explanation that would 
extend the structural analysis of the sign systems to the text”. ( Ricoeur, 
1991, p. 19 ) thus, ricoeur firstly rejects one-sided attitudes (“romanticist 
illusion” about the congeniality between the two subjectivities) of both 
the author and the reader, and secondly, he rejects “positivist illusions” of 
“textual objectivity closed in upon itself and wholly independent of the 
subjectivity of both the author and reader” (Ricoeur, 1991, p. 19).
the power of the text to project the world outside itself (the fictive 
world), creates the conditions of the reader’s relation to the presupposed 
world and to the world in which he really exists. According to Ricoeur, the 
interpretation is not the inter-subjective relation between the author and the 
reader of the text. rather, it is the relation of the reader to the fictive world, 
which is projected by his encounter with the text. Ricoeur states that to 
understand the text means to extend one’s experience and one’s picture of 
the world and time through the comprehension of imaginative variations 
created by the text.
“Non-referring” concepts of scientific theories can be compared to “non-
referring” concepts of literary texts. Their reference is opened up by the 
texts we read and they enlarge our experience and reality. 
2 Ricoeur’s remarks on romantic hermeneutics are partly incorrect. In Hermeneutics and 
Criticism (1838), Scheiermacher argues that interpretation is a twofold process, which 
include both author and text as objects of interpreation. He makes a distinction between 
psychological understanding (which aim to reproduce author’s intention and his creation 
of meaning) and grammatical understanding (which is based on the meaning of the text 
itself). In his essay ” The Understanding of Others and their Manifestations of Life” (1910), 
Dilthey introduces a broadened concept of hermeneutics which is not based on empathy and 
reconstruction of the author’s intention. He introduces the type of understanding, which is 
based on the articulating the meaning of the text itself. Therefore, Schleiermacher and Dilt-
hey both do not equate understanding of the text with understanding of  author’s intention, 
as Ricoeur argues.
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In Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur examines the possibility of reference in 
metaphorical texts. He arrives at the same conclusion that metaphorical texts 
and concepts refer, because they redescribe our picture of reality.
Ricoeur analyses the principles of the metaphor at the level of discourse 
or text, which assumes a hermeneutical and ontological approach. Ricoeur 
argues that in order to answer the question of what the metaphorical dis-
course tells us about reality, the ontological status of the metaphorical text 
must be established, i. e. it must be examined if metaphorical discourse has a 
referential dimension. Here, Ricoeur introduces the concept of metaphorical 
reference. This holds that the metaphor does not have a referential relation 
to reality, but that it creates the fiction toward which it establishes reference 
(Ricoeur, 1975, p. 221).
In  Rule of Metaphor Ricoeur states that the concept of reference does 
not only include denotation (representation), but also expression (exem-
plification).ricoeur argues that the question of reference can be perceived 
both from a semantic and a hermeneutical approach. According to Ricoeur, a 
semantic approach operates on the level of the sentence, while a hermeneu-
tical approach “addresses entities that are larger than a sentence” (Ricoeur, 
1975, p. 216).
Ricoeur argues that poetry has a referential function, it redescribes reality. 
According to Ricoeur, poetry has a referential function, just as descriptive 
discourse does. In poetry, images and feelings adhere to “sense”. However, 
“these are representations and not descriptions, which exemplify instead of 
denoting, and which transfer possession instead of retaining it by primordial 
light. qualities in this sense are no less real than the descriptive traits that 
scientific discourse articulates” (ricoeur, 1975, p. 221). ricoeur maintains 
that poetic qualities shape the world. “They are “true” to the extent that they 
are “appropriate”, that is, to the extent that they join fittingness to novelty, 
obviousness to surprise” (Ricoeur, 1975, p. 221)
3. Ricoeur and Scientific Realists: Real vs. Unreal
Ricoeur’s conception of reference can be applied to theories of scien-
tific realism.  “reality in the traditional metaphysicians’ construction of 
the concept, is the condition of things answering to “the real truth”. It is 
the realm of what really is, as it really is. The pivotal contrast is between 
“mere appearance” and “reality as such”, between “our picture of reality” 
and “reality itself”,  and between what actually is and what we merely think 
(believe, suppose) to be” (Recher, 2005, p. 9). 
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the foundation of scientific realism lies in the ontological thesis that 
there is a mind-independent world.3 Furthermore, it is grounded on the 
epistemic presupposition that “we can to some extent have adequate, des-
criptive information about this mind-independent realm, that we can validate 
plausible claims about some of the specifics of its constitution” (recher, 
2005, p. 21). 
Scientific realism is a viewpoint about unobservable (mind-independent) 
entities. “Realism is, in fact, a family of views about unobservables, including 
an epistemological view (we have scientific knowledge of unobservables, 
for our theories about them are true or approximately true), a metaphysical 
view (unobservables are mind- and theory- independent), a view about truth 
(statements about unobservables are made true or false by the way the world 
is), a view about reference (many of the terms that we used to think and talk 
about as unobservables genuinely refer), an axiological view (scientists aim 
to discover the facts about unobservables, and not merely to achieve accurate 
prediction and control), and a view about how to characterize scientific pro-
gress (later, better confirmed theories about unobservables are more likely 
to be true, or are better approximations of the truth from the theories they 
have suspended)” (Turner, 2004, p. 3). 
Turner, in his article, “The Past vs. the Tiny: Historical Science and the 
Abductive Argument for Realism”, examines the reasons why things are 
unobservable. According to him, there are two kinds of unobservables: 1) 
things that are unobservable because they are tiny, such as atoms and elec-
trons, and 2) things that are unobservable because they no longer exist, such 
as dinosaurs. Due to this distinction, he argues that there are two kinds of 
scientific realism: 1) experimental, which examines unobservables that are 
tiny, and 2) historical, which examines things that are unobservable because 
they are in the past. thus, he defines experimental realism as follows: “We 
currently have a good deal of scientific knowledge of things, events, and 
so forth that are unobservable because of their small size relative to us. (Or 
many of our beliefs about unobservable tiny entities, events, and so forth 
are true and approximately true)” (turner, 2004, p. 4). turner also defines 
historical realism: “We currently have a good deal of scientific knowledge 
of things, events, and so forth that are unobservable because they existed 
and occurred in the past (Turner, 2004, p. 4). 
turner argues that unobservables can serve as “unifiers of phenomena” 
or as “tools for production of new phenomena” (Turner, 2004, p. 2-3). Ac-
3 there are different versions of scientific realism. there are many domains to which rea-
lism can be applied: metaphysical, epistemic, semantic, ethical, etc. There are also strong 
and weak versions of scientifiv realism. However, all these forms of scientific realism are 
united in their claim that mind independent reality exists.
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cording to Turner, unobservables have a unifying role if they provide “the 
best explanatory unification of the phenomena” (turner, 2004, p. 2-3). On 
the other hand, unobservables such as electrons can be employed as tools for 
production of new phenomena. According to Turner, unobservable things that 
occurred in the past can only be employed as unifiers of phenomena. they 
cannot be employed as tools for producing new phenomena, because they 
“cannot be manipulated or altered by experiments in the present” (Turner, 
2004, p. 6). On the other hand, Turner agrees with Hacking’s opinion that the 
best reason for thinking electrons exist is that they can be used for detection 
to manipulate other unobservables and their construction.
Turner argues that the difference between these two kinds of unobserva-
bles is obvious. For example, palaeontology’s unobservable entities cannot 
be used in the design and construction of an experimental apparatus, as 
electrons can.4 On the other hand, experimental methods can give us reason 
to think that some observables, such as electrons, are real. At the same time, 
they cannot give us any reason to believe that, for example, angels are real 
(Turner, 2004, p. 9).
Turner maintains that he accepts Hacking’s theory, which is called “the 
experimental argument for realism”:
1.Scientists can interact with unobservable x’s (electrons and positrons) 
and thereby alter observable conditions in predictable and systematic 
ways.
2.The fact that scientists are able to control observables by means of 
unobservable x’s would be inexplicable if those x’s were not real.
3.Therefore, the unobservable x’s are probably real. (Turner, 2004, p. 
9).
Hacking’s idea is that learning the causal properties of unobservables 
can help scientists to build an experimental apparatus which will enable 
4 Theories about evolution have become an object of a sort of experimentation. They are 
tested with the help of computed simulation programs. artificial life simulation ( often cal-
led ”modal science” ) is more interested in the ”possible” than ”necessary” (Jos de Mul, 
1999). ”Rather than attempting to create prebiotic conditions from which life may emerge, 
this approach involves engineering over the first three billion years of life history to design 
complex evolvable artifical organisms, and then attempting to create the ecological conditi-
ons that will set off spontaneous evolutionary process of inventing diversity and complexity 
of organisms” (www.nis.atr.jp/~ray/pubs/tierra/node.1). ”artifical life is the study of artifial 
systems that exibit behavior characteristic of natural living systems. It is the quest to ex-
plain life in any of its possible manifestations, without restriction to the particular examples 
that have evolved on earth. This includes biological and chemical experiments, computer 
simulations, and purely theoretical endeavours” (www.boston.coop.net/~tpryor/wiki/index.
php?title= artificial_life). this approach shows that the sharp distinction between the actual 
and potential, and real and imaginary cannot be made. Furthermore, modal science opens 
up the realm of ”possible”, which was neglected or denied by realists. 
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them to control other unobservables, and also to produce and control new 
observable effects.
According to Turner, those unobservables are real because they can 
control and unify the observables.5
In the following lines,  turner’s first kind of unobservables (tiny), which 
were proven to be non-referential (such as aether, phlogiston) will be com-
pared to the unobservables in fictional narratives, which are non-existent. 
Subsequently, Turner’s second kind of unobservables (unobservable con-
cepts which are non-referring because they represent something that does 
not exist anymore) will be compared to non-referring concepts in historical 
narratives (which represent past events).
If reference is equated with denotation, none of these concepts refer. 
However, they are still part of our world and our reality.
Non-referring concepts in fictional narratives are part of our world and 
they reshape our reality and transform our experience. However, non-
referring concepts employed in once-successful scientific theories also 
refigured scientific knowledge and our perception of reality. Non-referring 
concepts that represent past things and events shape our reality in how they 
help us to comprehend present things and events. Although non-existent, 
those concepts create our world. Thus, the distinction between “real” and 
“unreal”, usually employed in science, history, but also in everyday life, 
should be examined and revised.
In Time and Narrative vol. 1, Ricoeur argues that it is a prejudice that 
only an entity that can be scientifically described and empirically observed, 
can be considered as real. 
In Time and Narrative 1, 2 and 3, Ricoeur emphasizes another kind of 
unobservable. He examines both non-existent entities represented in the poe-
tic mythos of fictional narratives, as well as unobservables which represent 
past events in historical narratives. This examination leads Ricoeur to the 
problem of what reality actually is. He tries to answer the question whether 
a sharp distinction between “real” and “unreal” can be made.
In Time and Narrative, vol. 3 Ricoeur argues, “…I am by no means den-
ying the absence of symmetry between a “real” past and an “unreal” world, 
the object being instead is to show in what unique way the imaginary is 
incorporated into the intended having-been, without weakening the “realist” 
aspect of this intention” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 181). Ricoeur argues that in his 
analysis of “real” he won’t separate the epistemological and ontological 
methods. His main question is what the “real past” is (Ricoeur, 1988, 
5 Turner is not relying on pragmatic notion of truth. As he emphasizes, he employs Hack-
ing’s ”experimental arguments for realism”. Hacking’s core idea is that an entity is real and 
we are able to prove its existence, only if we can manipulate it.
136
SA
N
JA
 IV
IC
p. 100). According to Ricoeur, historical texts are reconstructions of “real” 
events. ricoeur maintains, “It is precisely the significance attached to the 
word “reality”, when applied to the past that I hope to revive” (Ricoeur, 
1988, p. 100).
Ricoeur attempts to develop a critique of a naive concept of “reality” 
applied to past events. He maintains that this critique includes that of the 
“no less naive concept of unreality” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 158). According to 
Ricoeur, only broadened perspectives of reality (unreality) can enable us to 
understand the reference of fictional and historical narratives. 
Ricoeur claims that he will try to prove that the abyss between the “real” 
past and “unreal” fiction is not unbridgeable. 
Ricoeur points to two different meanings of the term “to represent,” and 
he explains in which sense historical narratives represent the past: “And I 
will adopt this distinction between representing in the sense of “standing 
for” (Vertreten) something, and representing something to oneself in the 
sense of giving oneself a mental image of some absent external thing (Sich 
Vorstellen). In effect, insofar as a trace is left by the past, it stands for it. 
In regard to the past, the trace exercises a function of “taking the place 
of” (Lieutenance), of “standing for” (Representance) or Vertretung. This 
function characterizes the indirect reference proper to knowledge through 
traces, and distinguishes it from every other referential mode of history in 
relation to the past. Of course, it is only by means of an endless rectification 
of our configurations that we form the idea of the past as an inexhaustible 
resource” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 143). 
Therefore, history represents past events in the sense of Vertretung, 
“standing for”. ricoeur asks if there is a corresponding function of fiction. 
He argues that in order to answer this question, the concept of “unreality” 
should be revised as well as the concept of “reality of the past” (Ricoeur, 
1988, p. 192).
ricoeur argues about the quasi-historical character of fiction and the 
quasi-fictional character of history: “the interpretation I am proposing here 
of the “quasi-historical” character of fiction quite clearly overlaps with the 
interpretation I also proposed of the “quasi-fictive” character of the historical 
past. It is true that one function of fiction bound up with history is to free, 
retrospectively, certain possibilities that were not actualized in the historical 
past; it is owing to its quasi-historical character that fiction itself is able, 
after the fact, to perform its liberating function. the quasi-past of fiction in 
this way becomes the detector of possibilities buried in the actual past. What 
“might have been” - the possibility in Aristotle’s terms - includes both the 
potentialities of the “real” past and the “unreal” possibilities of pure fiction” 
(Ricoeur, 1988, p. 191-192).
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after introducing his theory of refiguration, ricoeur states that it is 
possible to argue about the capacity of fictional narratives in order to assert 
claims to the truth. Ricoeur does not separate the problem of reference 
between fictional and historical narratives.
In chapter seven of Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur argues that all the problems 
of reference can be solved only on the level of hermeneutics. The problem of 
reference in narrative discourse embraces asymmetry of referential modes of 
historiography and fiction. On the one hand, the problem with reference in 
narrative discourse is that it must rely on the imagination, and therefore, it 
contains metaphoric reference. On the other hand, fictional narratives employ 
reference based on traces. They indirectly refer to our reality; otherwise they 
would not be comprehensible.
the fictionalization of history embraces a certain role of the imagination 
in the intention of historians to depict the past as it really was. Past occurren-
ces cannot be perceived, and in this way the room for imagination is open. 
The time of the calendar, the succession of generations, and the concept 
of deducing the past from traces, can be perceived not only as intellectual, 
but also as imaginative operations, which lie on certain schematisms and 
conventions. According to Ricoeur, the concept of representation of the past 
is based on imaginative activity. Depicting the past and identifying with it 
is possible only with the help of the imagination.
the quasi-historical  nature of fictional narratives is based on the fact 
that narratives always represent the past of the narrative voice. Ricoeur’s 
second argument about the quasi-historicity of the narrative function is 
based on Aristotle’s understanding of the norms of possibility and necessi-
ty.6 ricoeur’s quasi-historicity assumes that from the text, narrative fiction 
configures by the text even those possibilities which are not realized in the 
past; which is, however, another way of formulation Aristotle’s understan-
ding of possibility and necessity. “... I developed the notion of the world 
of the text. A text, actually, is not a self-enclosed entity. It not only has a 
formal structure, but it points beyond itself to a possible world, a world I 
6 Acording to Aristotle: “... the poet’s function is to describe not the thing that has happened, 
but a kind of thing that might happen, i. e. what is possible as being probable or necessary. 
The distinction between a historian and a poet is not in the one writing prose and the other 
verse – you might put the work of Herodotus into verse, and it will still be in the species of 
history. It consists really in this, that one describes the thing that has been, and the other a 
kind of thing that might be. Hence, poetry is something more philosophic and of graver im-
portance than history, since its statements are about nature rather than universals, whereas 
those of history are about singulars. ” ( Aristotle, Poetics, Ix ) Unlike Aristotle, Ricoeur 
argues that both poetry and history represent what might be or what might have been, which 
lies in the domain of  “probable” and not “necessary”.
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could inhabit, where I could actualize my own possibilities, in so far as I 
am in the world” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 349). 
ricoeur argues that fictional texts indirectly refer to the world. they 
indirectly aim at the “real” and this is “a mimetic relation by which the text 
is externalized” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 349). According to Ricoeur, the world of 
the fictional text is “a transcedence in the immanence of the text, an outside 
intended by an inside” (Ricoeur, 1988, p. 349).
ricoeur argues that the quasi-historical character of fiction interweaves 
with quasi-fictional character of the historical past: “It is because of its 
quasi-historical character that fiction can exercise its liberating function 
with respect to possible hidden elements in the actual past. What “could 
have taken place” – the object of poetry as opposed to history, according to 
Aristotle – fuses with the potentialities of the “real” past and the “unreal” 
possibilities of pure fiction” (ricoeur, 1988, p. 349).
Ricoeur argues that in order to answer the question in which way his-
torical and fictional narratives interweave, the nature of reference in both 
kinds of narratives must be examined. Ricoeur repeats that he rejects the 
notion of reference as a denotative relation of a particular sign and particular 
phenomenon, because he does not want to neglect the transformative aspect 
of the relation of the text to reality. The text cannot designate something 
as a word designates a concept. For Ricoeur, reference is the conception of 
the relation to reality understood in its broadest sense. However, when he 
argues about the relation of historical and fictional texts to reality, he uses 
the term “refiguration”. refiguration includes the transformation of reality 
which is first prefigured in the consciousness of the author, then configured 
in the text, and then, finally, transformed to the virtual experience of the 
reader, which leads to comprehension. 
Ricoeur attempts to analyse the problem of reference in all its complexity. 
according to ricoeur, history can be compared to fiction in regard to its 
configurative processes and refigurative effects. History can never represent 
the past as it really was, and in this respect it contains fictional and imagina-
tive aspects. By entering into the fictional world, fictional narratives have an 
unfolding and transformative effect with regard to the human praxis, because 
their relation to reality is not referential, but refigurative. 
While in declarative discourse the primary function of words is to refer, 
this function does not necessarily have truthful value. 
ricoeur argues that by calling fictive entities “unreal”, we claim that 
they are non-referential. However, he emphasizes that fictional texts have 
a “transformative effect”: “the effects of fiction, effects of revelation and 
transformation, are essentially effects of reading. It is by way of reading 
that literature returns to life, that is, to the practical and affective field of 
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existence. Therefore, it is along the pathway of a theory of reading that 
we shall seek to determine the relation of application, that constitutes the 
equivalent of the relation of standing-for, in the domain of fiction” (ricoeur, 
1988, p. 101). 
When the conceptions of reality and unreality are revised and not unders-
tood as too narrow, it is possible to argue about the reference of historical 
and fictional narratives.
Historical narratives include aspirations to the truth and to the real past, 
while fictional narratives create imaginative variations, as aristotle states 
in his Poetics – historians talk about true events, and poets talk about 
events that could have happened according to the laws of possibility and 
necessity. However, Ricoeur examines the relation between the reference of 
historical and fictional narratives and argues about the similarities between 
these two. 
In the end, the question is whether historical narratives are just variations 
of fictional narratives, or if fictional narratives are variations of historical 
narratives.
4. Refigurative Aspect of Reference
Ricoeur’s conception of reference embraces a relation to reality in its 
broadest sense. ricoeur’s conception of refiguration represents the shift from 
the “epistemological dimension of reference to a hermeneutical dimension 
of refiguration” (ricoeur, 1988, p. 5). therefore, ricoeur’s conception of 
reference as refiguration can be applied even to “non-existent” concepts in 
scientific theories and historical and fictional narratives.
the ontological, refigurative aspect of reference has yet another side. 
Not only do “non-referring” concepts shape our reality, but they are also 
constantly “rewritten” and “reread”. For example, “Our” Homer is not 
identical with the Homer in the Middle Ages, nor is “our” Shakespeare with 
that of his contemporaries. Rather, it is that different historical periods have 
constructed a “different” Homer and Shakespeare for their own purposes, 
and found in these texts elements to value or devalue, though not neces-
sarily the same ones. All literary works, in other words, are “rewritten”, if 
only unconsciously, by the societies which read them. Indeed, there is no 
reading of a work that is not also a “rewriting”. No work, and no current 
evaluation of it, can simply be extended to new groups of people without 
being changed, perhaps almost unrecognizably, in the process; which is one 
reason why what counts as literature is a notably unstable affair” (Eagleton, 
1990, p. 12).
This idea was emphasized by H. R. Jauss and W. Iser, the proponents of 
the theory of reception. They argued that the theory of reception is founded 
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on individual and historical grounds. Jauss and Isser emphasized that there 
is a possibility of different realisations of a text if read by multiple readers 
(this is the domain of reception aesthetics). On the other hand, they argued 
that those readings are also different in different historical periods (this is the 
domain of receptive history) (Henderson & Brown, 1997). Even historical 
events described in historical texts can be perceived and interpreted from 
different perspectives in regard to limited documentation and proof, but 
also in regard to the subjective interests of those who try to reconstruct a 
historical event. Different interpretations of historical texts and events can 
also be a result of social and cultural changes, which define the conception 
of values from which the past events are interpreted and valued.
This argument that “reality” does not have stable content sheds new light 
upon realism itself – not only in science, but also in literature, as I will argue 
in the following lines. this revised conception of “reality” also influences 
our understanding of history, since historians try to be realists about past 
events – attempting to reconstruct the reality of the past. 
this brings us back to the theories of scientific realism and their aspi-
rations to describe “truth” and “reality” which are, according to realists, 
mind-independent. there are different versions of scientific realism, that 
scientific realism is not fixed. “to be a scientific realist is to be a realist about 
science. But how much of science are we invited to be realists about – and 
what qualifies as science anyway? and what exactly is it to be a realist about 
those parts? “Realism” about “x” has two components that are linked to one 
another: “realism” and “x” any formulation of scientific realism can thus be 
designed by letting “x” vary or by letting “realism” vary or by letting both 
vary” (Mäki, 2005, p. 232). 
therefore, the content of realism should not be perceived as fixed but 
rather as an ontological doctrine (Mäki, 2005,  p. 236).
In this weak version of scientific realism, a realist does not claim that 
“x” exists, but instead he claims it is possible that “x” exists.7 Thus, “x” in 
the theories of scientific realism represents an entity, which has a chance 
of existing. ( Mäki, 2005, p. 238 ) The difference between realists and an-
tirealists concerning “x” is that antirealists do not even give “x” a chance 
to exist “and have no interest in further inquires into its existential status” 
(Mäki, 2005, p. 239).
this version of scientific realism brings a new perspective on the problem 
of non-referential concepts of once successful scientific theories:  “It took 
a realist attitude to propose that phlogiston might exist, and it took a realist 
attitude to conclude, after some further inquires, that it does not exist after 
7 On the other hand, one can be a realist about x by claiming that x exists.
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all: in both cases, one believes there is a fact of the matter in virtue of which 
phlogiston does or does not exist (...). Such a belief is a realist belief.” ( 
Mäki, 2005, p. 238 ) therefore, “truth nomination is sufficient for realism, 
while truth ascription is not necessary for realism” (Mäki, 2005, p. 241).
5. Conclusion
Recognition of only one aspect of reference (epistemological) is one-si-
ded and cannot explain the potential of “non-referential” terms to restructure 
our reality. Ricoeur argues that even non-referential concepts employed in 
fictional and historical narratives, have the power to transform and affect our 
praxis and experience. This is the basic assumption of his theory of reference 
as refiguration. this theory rejects realist aspirations in history, science and 
literature, which attempt to represent “reality as it is” and deny the posibility 
for non-referentials to be a part of our world and our experience.
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